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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a new solution in a cooperative game with a coalition structure. The
collective value of a player is defined as the summation of equal division of pure surplus which his
coalition obtained from the coalitional bargaining and his Shapley value for the internal coalition. The
weighted Shapley value applied for a game played by coalitions with coalition-size weights, is assigned
to each coalition, reflecting the size-asymmetries among coalitions. On the surface, this solution appears
to lie in the very different line from existing studies, but we show that the collective values matches
endogenous and exogenous interpretations of coalition structures. In addition to the potential function
which derives the solution, two axiomatic characterizations of the collective value are also presented.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a distribution rule of a cooperative surplus among players when they already partition
themselves into ‘coalitions’ before realizing cooperation. A distribution rule, a solution concept in a frame-
work of a cooperative game with a coalition structure, considered in this paper departs from the existing
solution concepts in two major directions. One is to take into account the mutual-aid tendency of groups
or generous reallocation among members in the internal cooperation.1 This point is expressed through a
two-step approach introduced by Kamijo (2007). The other is to treat the asymmetric sizes of coalitions as
a factor affecting the bargaining outcome. From the theoretical point of view, Kalai (1977) and Thomson
(1986) show that in the context of bargaining problems, purely replications of players generate the size-
dependent asymmetric weights of the Nash solution. On the other hand, from an empirical point of view,
Metcalf, Wadsworth, and Ingram (1993) reported that in the observations of British manufacturing industry,
strike incidence rose with the size of bargaining group, and it is known that the strike activity affects the
bargaining outcome between employers and employees.2
The Aumann and Dreze’s (1974) value and the Owen’s (1977) coalitional value, two traditional solution
concepts in cooperative games with coalition structures and each of which is an extension of the Shapley
value to a cooperative game with a coalition structure, do not satisfy both requirements mentioned above.
On the one hand, both solutions give nothing to a player with no effective contribution whatever cooperation
relationship he belongs to. Thus, according to these solution concepts, it does not happen that such player
receives some portion of the cooperation surplus from his coalition due to a strong position of his coalition,
thus these solutions not having an essence of mutual assistance within the internal members. On the other
hand, these solutions treat two distinct coalitions equally even if these are different in their sizes. As pointed
out by Hart and Kurz (1983) and Winter (1992), a solution concept of a cooperative game with a coalition
structure assumes the two levels interaction among players, i.e., interactions inter- and intra- coalitions.
In fact, the Owen’s coalitional value satisfies the condition that the sum of the coalitional values of the
players in a coalition coincides with the Shapley value of the coalition obtained from the game which is
played by inter-coalitions. Thus, the coalitional value well describes a two levels interaction but not reflects
an asymmetry in the interaction among coalitions pointed out by Kalai and Samet (1987) and Levy and
McLean (1989), caused by the sizes of the coalitions.
The definition of our new solution concept, named a collective value, is established relying on a two-
step bargaining process among players, a bargaining inter-coalitions in the first step and a bargaining intra-
coalition in the second, and generous reallocation tendency among the internal members. In the first step,
each coalition obtains its weighted Shapley value applied for a game among coalitions. The pure surplus
of a coalition in the first step bargaining (its weighted Shapley value obtained from the first step minus
the worth of the coalition) is divided equally among players in the coalition. In the second step, players
in the coalition receive their Shapley value applied for their own internal game. Thus, the collective value
gives the sum of the payoffs in the first step and the second to each player. This definition means that
1Such tendency of groups is examined and explained in various contexts. Kropotkin (1972) explains this from a human
evolution in the struggle for life. In a context of rent-seeking problem among two groups, Noh (1999) demonstrates that the group
members can agree with egalitarian-like sharing rule among them to resolve a free rider problem in the group. Researchers in
community psychology argue that recent development of a number of mutual assistance organizations is due to divergent stressful
situations around ourselves (Levine 1988). Further, in the study of labor-management, reasons for and usefulness of profit sharing
among employer and employees are examined (FitzRoy and Kraft 1986, 1987; Drago and Turnbull 1988; Kandel and Lazear
1992).
2One reason is that most union power is partly derived from the threat of the strike (Ashenfelter and Johnson 1969).
1
the collective value is involved with the egalitarian solution as well as the Shapley value: the egalitarian
solution is used for the bargaining surplus of a coalition and the Shapley value for the worth of the coalition.
On the surface, our solution concept appears to lie in the very different line of research from exist-
ing studies. However, the collective value matches endogenous and exogenous interpretations of coalition
structures. Aumann and Dreze (1974) consider that the existing coalition structure arises from the en-
dogenous formation of coalitions, given the game itself. They consider that lack of the superadditivity of
the game leads to the formation of coalition structures. Here, we provide a different condition, a quasi-
partnership decomposition, which is also considered as a reason of forming coalition structures and show
that the collective value is consistent with this this condition. Furthermore, in the line of Myerson (1977,
1980), a coalition structure can be considered as exogenously given communication restriction among play-
ers. We introduce a new interpretation of the coalition structure as restriction of communication among
players and show that the collective value coincides with the Shapley value applied for the game appropri-
ately derived from the original game. Thus, the collective value is consistent with these interpretations of
coalition structures.
Further, with the aid of research by Calvo and Santos (1997) and Bilbao (1998) on potential theory in
cooperative games with communication restriction, we obtain a potential function for games with coalition
structures, which is quite different from the one of Winter (1992). The collective value is expressed as
the marginal contribution relative to this potential function. The potential function behind the solution
concept inspires one of its properties similar to the balanced contributions of the Shapley value. We show
that this property, called a collective balanced contributions, with some moderate additional conditions
characterizes our solution. An axiomatization by the additivity axiom is also presented.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give the basic notations and
definitions used in this paper. The exact definition of a new solution concept is provided in Section 3. In
Section 4, other expressions and interpretations of the solution are explained. In Section 5, we show that
the collective value admits a potential function. Axiomatic characterizations of this solution are given in
Section 6. Section 7 gives concluding remarks.
2 Preliminary
A cooperative game or a simply game is a pair (N;v) where N = f1; : : : ;ng is a finite set of players and
v : 2N ! R is a characteristic function with v( /0) = 0. A subset S of N is called a coalition and v(S) is the
worth of coalition S. The set of all the games is denoted by G. We use the short-cut notations of S¡ i
and S[ i instead of S nfig and S[fig for convenience. Given (N;v) 2 G and a coalition S, we denote the
subgame of (N;v) to S by (S;v) if there is no risk of confusion.
A game (N;v) is superadditive if for any two coalitions S and T with S\T = /0, v(S[T )= v(S)+v(T ).
A game (N;v) is zero-monotonic if for any player i and for any coalition SµN¡ i, v(S[ i)= v(S)+v(fig).
A superadditive game is, of course, zero-monotonic but the inverse is not true.
Player i 2 N is a null player if v(S[ i) = v(S) for any S µ N ¡ i and a dummy player if v(S[ i) =
v(S)+ v(fig) for any S µ N¡ i. Clearly a null player is also dummy but the converse does not hold. It is
said that i 2 N and j 2 N are symmetric in (N;v) if v(S[ i) = v(S[ j) for any S µ N nfi; jg and i 2 N and
j 2 are symmetric in (T;v), T µ N, if v(S[ i) = v(S[ j) for any S µ T nfi; jg.
Assuming that the grand coalition N will be formed, the question arises how to divide the worth v(N)
among the players. Thus, a solution of a game is a function φ which assigns to every game (N;v) 2 G a
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payoff vector φ(N;v) = (φi(N;v))i2N 2 RN that satisfies ∑i2N φi(N;v)· v(N). If φ always distributes just
v(N) to the players, it is called an efficient solution.
A well-known solution was provided by Shapley (1953b). Let θ : N !N denote a permutation on N and
Θ(N) denote a set of all the permutations on N. A permutation θ is identified as an order (i1; : : : ; in) on N if
θ( j) = k implies ik = j, and vice versa. A set of players preceding to i at order θ is Aθi = f j 2 N : θ( j)<
θ(i)g. A marginal contribution of player i at order θ in (N;v) is defined by mθi (N;v) = v(Aθi [ i)¡ v(Aθi ).
The Shapley value Sh of (N;v) is defined as follows:
Shi(N;v) =
1
jΘ(N)j ∑θ2Θ(N)m
θ
i (N;v); for all i 2 N;
where j ¢ j represents the cardinality of the set. Thus, the Shapley value is an average of marginal contribution
vectors where each order θ 2 Θ(N) occurs in an equal probability, that is, 1=jΘ(N)j.
The Shapley value is characterized by the four properties: (i) efficiency, (ii) additivity, (iii) symmetry
and (iv) null player. Let φ be a solution on G. The efficiency requires that the solution distributes the
worth of the grand coalition to the players. The additivity is that for any two games (N;v) and (N;v0),
φ(N;v+v0) = φ(N;v)+φ(v0) holds where the additive game v+v0 is defined by (v+v0)(S) = v(S)+v0(S)
for any S µ N. The symmetry means that two symmetric players in (N;v) receive the equal payoffs, thus,
φi(N;v) = φ j(N;v) holds whenever i and j are symmetric in (N;v). The null players axiom is that the null
player always obtains nothing.
In various applications of cooperative games, it seems to be natural that players partitions themselves
into some ‘coalitions’ such as labor union, syndicate of firms, customs unions in international economics,
and so on. Such coalitions form a coalition structure C = fC1; : : : ;Cmg, which is partition of N, i.e., it holds
that Ck\Ch = /0 for any k and any h with k 6= h andSmk=1Ck =N. Such a situation, called a cooperative game
with a coalition structure, is first considered by Aumann and Dreze (1974) and developed by a number of
authors. A counterpart of the Shapley value for such games was defined by Owen (1977) and given the
axiomatic foundation from the viewpoint of coalition formation by Hart and Kurz (1983).
A game with a coalition structure is a triple (N;v;C ) where (N;v) is a game and C = fC1; : : : ;Cmg is
a coalition structure. We usually use notation M = f1; : : : ;mg to denote the set of coalitional indices in C .
The set of all the games with coalition structures is denoted by Gc. An order θ 2 Θ(N) is consistent with
C if for any i 2Ch 2 C and j 2Ch 2 C and k 2 N, θ(i)< θ(k)< θ( j) implies that player k also belongs to
coalition Ch, that is, k 2Ch. Thus, in the consistent order, players line up in a way that players in the same
coalition are side-by-side. A set of all the orders on N consistent with C is denoted by Θ(N;C ). Then,
Owen’s (1977) coalitional value CV is an average of player’s marginal contributions when all the orders
consistent with C occur with equal probability, being defined by,
CVi(N;v;C ) =
1
jΘ(N;C )j ∑θ2Θ(N;C )m
θ
i (N;v); for each i 2 N:
Thus, according to the coalitional value, players in N appear in a way that the players in the same coalition
appear successively. In other words, first coalitions enter subsequently in a random order and within each
coalition the players enter subsequently in a random order.
An external game or a game played by the (representatives of the) coalitions (M;vC ) is defined by M =
3
f1; : : : ;mg and vC (H) = v(Sk2H Ck) for each H µ M.3 For external game (M;vC ), the Owen’s coalitional
value satisfies the following: for any Ck 2 C ,
∑
i2Ck
CVi(N;v;C ) = CVk(M;vC ;fMg):
This property is called the intermediate game property. The coalitional value is characterized by efficiency,
additivity, null player property, the intermediate game property and the restricted equal treatment property
which requires that if two players in Ck 2 C are symmetric in (N;v), the two players should receive the
equal payoff (see Owen 1977 and Peleg and Sudho¨lter 2003). Here, the first three axioms are the ones
which are naturally extended to a game with a coalition structure. However, the null player property in this
case may be considered to be a bit strong requirement because it means that the null player gets nothing
even though the coalition he belongs to is in very strong position. Thus, the coalitional value does not
reflect a function of the formed coalition as system of mutual assistance. In Section 6, we provide a weaker
version of the null player property in a game with a coalition structure to characterize our new solution,
which is defined in the next section.
3 A new solution concept
As motivated by Hart and Kurz (1983) and Winter (1989), the coalition in C can be seen as a pressure
group for the division of v(N). So, van den Brink and van der Laan (2005) stated (p195):
to divide the worth of the grand coalition over all players, first this worth is distributed over the
coalitions in the a priori given coalition structure, and then the payoff assigned to a coalition is
distributed over its players.
The Owen’s coalitional value describes the above two level interactions, which are an interaction among
coalitions and a one among players within a coalition, and has the consistent relation with the Shapley
value’s allocation. The coalitional value satisfies
∑
i2Ck
CVi(N;v;C ) = CVk(M;vC ;fMg) = Shk(M;vC )
for any Ck 2 C because the coalitional value satisfies the intermediate game property and the coalitional
value for a game with the grand coalition structure coincides with the Shapley value for the game.
There is an asymmetry of players in external game (M;vC ) since players in the game represent the
coalitions which may be different in size. In such a situation, the weighted Shapley value (Shapley 1953a)
can be appropriate to deal with such asymmetries. Kalai and Samet stated in their paper (Kalai and Samet
1987, p221) as follows:
It is important for applications in which the players themselves are, or are representing, groups
of individuals. Such is the case for example when the players are parties, cities, or management
boards. ... A natural candidate for a solution is the weighted Shapley value where the players
are weighted by the size of the constituencies they stand for.
3This game is referred to as an intermediate game in Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003) and as a quotient game in Owen (1977).
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As the following definition will show, a new solution concept presented in this paper is the very solution
that reflects such a viewpoint in addition to the two level interactions.
Let wi(> 0) denote a positive weight for a player i 2 N. Given a collection of positive weights w =
(wi)i2N , let µw(:) represent a probability measure on Θ(N) such that for an order θ = (i1; : : : ; in), µw(θ) =
Πnj=1
wi j
∑ jk=1 wik
.
4 The w-weighted Shapley value Shw for (N;v) 2 G is
Shwi (N;v) = ∑
θ2Θ(N)
µw(θ)mθi (N;v)
for any i 2 N.5
Clearly, if wi = w j for any i 2 N and for any j 2 N, the w-weighted Shapley value coincides with the
Shapley value. Given coalition T of N, let (N;uT ) denote a T -unanimity game defined by uT (S) = 1 if
S ¶ T and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. It is easily checked that Shwi (N;uT ) = wi∑ j2T w j if i 2 T and Sh
w
i (N;uT ) = 0
otherwise.
A solution concept ψγ in a game with a coalition structure is defined in the following.
Definition 1. For (N;v;C ) 2 Gc, let wk denote the weight for k 2 M such that wk = jCkj and w = (wk)k2M.
Then, the collective value ψγ for (N;v;C ) is defined by
ψγi (N;v;C ) =
Shwk (M;vC )¡ v(Ck)
jCkj +Shi(Ck;v)
for any i 2Ck 2 C .
The definition of the collective value shows the relation with a two step approach introduced in Kamijo
(2007): the first step is a negotiation among coalitions for the division of v(N) and the second step is a nego-
tiation among players for the division of the assignment of the coalition from the first step. The bargaining
surplus of the coalition from the first step, Shwk (M;vC )¡ v(Ck), is equally divided among its members.
Moreover they obtain the Shapley value for their own game in the second step, Sh(Ck;v). Thus, this ex-
pression indicates that ψγ has a flavor of egalitarian rule in addition to the Shapley value: the egalitarian
solution for the bargaining surplus of his coalition and the Shapley value for the worth of the coalition. As
the result of this egalitarian part, ψγ does not satisfy the usual null player axiom but the weaker version of
null player axiom. This point is considered in section 6 to characterize the collective value by the additivity
axiom.
The particular difference from Owen (1977) and Kamijo (2007) is that in the definition above, each
coalition, say Ck, receives Shwk (M;vC ), i.e., the w-weighted Shapley value of the external game, instead of
the usual Shapley value. Further, the weights are the sizes of each coalition, i.e., wk = jCkj for each Ck 2 C .
4To obtain this probability, consider the following model of choosing an order (i1; : : : ; in). First, a player in N, say in, is
randomly selected, due to a probability distribution such that the probability for a player to be selected is proportional to his
weight and put in the last of the order. Next, another player in¡1 is selected by the same process for n¡1 players and put in the
second last of the order. Repeating the same process by n¡2 times, we have an order (i1; : : : ; in) and the probability of occurrence
of this order is this formula.
5Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988) generalized positive weights to a weight system which is a pair of weights and an ordered
partition on N in order to allow a weight of zero for some of the players.
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From the definition, it easily confirmed that ψγ satisfies
∑
i2Ck
ψγi (N;v;C ) = Shwk (M;vC );
reflecting the asymmetries in the sizes of coalitions.
One may consider that the definition of the collective value is a bid strange because it applies incon-
sistent treatment between a negotiation among coalitions and a negotiation within a coalition. This is
not true, however; rather the collective value treats the two types of bargaining in consistent manner in
terms of the players’ sizes because in the subgame (Ck;v), each player in Ck has an equal size and the
weighted Shapley value with equal weights among the players coincides with the Shapley value, that is,
Shw(Ck;v) = Sh(Ck;v), given wi = 1 for all i 2Ck.
To obtain a better understanding on a two-step interpretation of ψγ , we introduce a “redistribution
game” defined below. Let φ be a solution on G and Ck 2 C . Define a function vr(:jφ) : 2Ck ! R by, for all
S µCk,
vr(Sjφ) =
½ φk(M;vC ) if S =Ck;
v(S) otherwise:
A game (Ck;vr(:jφ)) is called a redistribution game for Ck over the coalitional bargaining surplus at distri-
bution rule φ . Let (N;v;C ) 2 Gc, Ck 2 C , and M = fk : Ck 2 C g. Let w = (wk)k2M with wk = jCkj for any
k 2 M. The following theorem is easily derived from the definition of ψγ .
Theorem 1. For Ck 2 C and for i 2Ck,
ψγi (N;v;C ) = Shi(Ck;vr(:jShw)):
Proof. Define (Ck;u) by u(S) = Shwk (M;vC )¡ v(Ck) if S = Ck and u(S) = 0 otherwise. Then, vr(:jShw) =
v+u. Since the Shapley value satisfies the additivity,
Shi(Ck;vr(:jShw)) = Shi(Ck;v)+Shi(Ck;u):
Furthermore, since the Shapley value satisfies the symmetry and the efficiency, Shi(Ck;u) = Sh
w
k (M;vC )¡v(Ck)
jCkj .
Remark 1. The Owen’s coalitional value is also described as the Shapley value for the other type of
redistribution game. For Ck 2 C , (Ck;vc(:jφ)) is defined by vc(Sjφ) = φk(M;vSC ) for all S µ Ck where
(M;vSC ) is a game played by coalitions with Ck being replaced by S ½ Ck. That is, vSC (H) =
S
h2H Ch if
k =2 H and vSC (H) =
S
h2HnfkgCh [ S if k 2 H. Then, CVi(N;v;C ) = Shi(Ck;vc(:jSh)) holds (see, Owen
1977 and Winter 1992).
Remark 2. Kamijo (2006, 2007) considers another two-step Shapley value in which the Shapley value is
applied for both intra- and inter- coalitions. In other words, not the weighted Shapley value but the usual
Shapley value is applied to the external game. Thus, a solution ψδ on Gc is defined by
ψδi (N;v;C ) = Shi(Ck;vr(:jSh)) =
Shk(M;vC )¡ v(Ck)
jCkj +Shi(Ck;v)
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for any Ck 2 C and for any i 2Ck.
4 Interpretations of the value and coalition structures
In this section, we consider an endogenous interpretation and an exogenous interpretation of coalition
structures and show that the collective value fits these interpretations.
4.1 A value on C -communication restricted situation
An exogenous interpretation of coalition structures is that they represent the some kinds of constraint on
communication among players (see Aumann and Dreze 1974). Myerson (1977) considers a situation that
a communication between players is restricted on an undirected graph of N (such game is called a graph-
restricted game). Myerson (1980) considers more generalized situation that there is a sequence of confer-
ences in which players communicate with each other and this communication restriction is expressed as the
hyper-graph on N. Since Myerson’s works, there are various kinds of research on games with restriction
or constraint on communication among players (e.g., a permission structure by Gilles, Owen, and van den
Brink 1992; restricted coalitions by Derks and Peters 1993; a weighted hyper-graph by Amer and Carreras
1995, 1997; a probabilistic graph by Calvo, Lasaga, and van den Nouweland 1999; a partition system by
Bilbao 1998).
Along this line of research, Aumann and Dreze’s (1974) value, which is defined by ADi(N;v;C ) =
Sh(Ck;v) for all i 2 Ck 2 C , assumes a situation that a coalition structure describes a communication re-
striction such that players in the same coalition communicate with each other, but each coalition is phys-
ically separated. This situation is also described as the graph such that each maximal component of the
graph corresponds to a coalition in the coalition structure and each subgraph on the component is a com-
plete graph. Thus, Aumann and Dreze’s value coincides with the Myerson value for such a graph situation.
However, this interpretation of coalition structure does not fit the view that players form coalitions for the
division of v(N) since Aumann and Dreze’s value does not satisfy the efficiency but the relative efficiency
(∑i2N ADi(N;v;C ) = ∑k2M v(Ck)). This motivates another view of communication restriction by a coalition
structure below.
Given a coalition structure C on N, assume that C represents the communication restricted situation as
follows:
(i) players in the same coalition Ck 2 C can freely communicate with each other, and
(ii) players in Ck can communicate with players in the other coalitions if there is a permission of all the
players in Ck.
Condition (i) means that players in any sub coalition S µ Ck 2 C can communicate with each other
and thus obtain their worth of coalition, v(S). In addition to (i), (ii) implies that there is a possibility of
cooperation among players in the different coalitions. This is possible only if all the players in the relevant
coalitions agree. Let i 2Ck and Ch 2 C ;Ch 6=Ck. While Ck and Ch obtain their worth v(Ck[Ch), Ck¡ i and
Ch obtain the sum of v(Ck¡ i) and v(Ch) because there is no permission by player i or there is no permission
of the party which the coalition represents and which requires the unanimous agreement.6
6Carreras (1992) refers the similar restriction of coalition as “voting discipline” in the context of simple games.
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Definition 2. Let (N;v;C ) 2 Gc. C -communication restricted game (N;vC ) is defined as follows. For all
S µ N,
vC (S) = v(
[
Ck2C (S)
Ck)+ ∑
T2C 0(S)
v(T )
where C (S) = fCk 2 C : Ck µ Sg and C 0(S) = fCk\S : Ck\S 6=Ck;Ck 2 C g.
Then, ψγ is interpreted as a value on the C -communication restricted game.
Theorem 2. Let (N;v;C ) 2 Gc. For i 2 N,
ψγi (N;v;C ) = Shi(N;vC ):
Proof. Take any order θ 2 Θ(N). Let θ [Ck] denote an order on Ck induced from θ such that for any
i; j 2Ck, θ [Ck](i)< θ [Ck]( j) exactly if θ(i)< θ( j), and let θM denote an order on M induced from θ such
that for any k;h 2 M, θM(k)< θM(h) exactly if there is a player i 2Ch such that θ( j)< θ(i) for all j 2Ck.
According to marginal contributions in C -communication restricted game vC at order θ , i 2 Ck obtains,
when i is not the last in the order θ [Ck],
v(Aθ [Ck]i [ i)¡ v(Aθ [Ck]i );
and when i is the last in the order, he obtains
[v(AθMk [Ck)¡ v(AθMk )]¡ v(Ck)+ [v(Ck)¡ v(Ck¡ i)]:
Because in the situation that each θ 2 Θ(N) occurs in equal probability, θ [Ck] coincides with one order
on Ck in probability 1=jΘ(Ck)j, thus irrelevant to the selection of the order, and each i 2 Ck has a equal
probability to be the last, it suffices to show that ∑i2Ck Shi(N;vC ) = Shwk (M;vC ).
We denote by Prob(¢) the probability that some phenomena happen in the situation that each θ 2Θ(N)
occurs in equal probability 1=jΘ(N)j. We will show that for any given order σ 2 Θ(M), Prob(θM = σ) is
µw(σ) where wk = jCkj for each k 2 M. For simplifying explanation, let σ = (σ1; : : : ;σm) be (1; : : : ;m).
First, we consider the probability that θM(m) coincides with σm = m, that is, Prob(θM(m) = m). Since this
probability is equal to the probability that some player in Cm is the last position in order θ , we obtain
Prob(θM(m) = m) =
jCmj
jNj =
wm
∑h2M wh
:
Further, assume that Prob(θM(h) = h;h = k+1; : : : ;m) = Πmh=k+1
wh
∑hh0=1 wh0
. Then, given the condition that
θM(h) = h;h = k+1; : : : ;m, the conditional probability that θM(k) coincides with k is
jCkj
∑kh0=1 jCh0 j
=
wk
∑kh0=1 wh0
;
because this probability is equal to the probability that some i2Ck is the last player in the order that players
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in Ch;h = k+1; : : : ;m are extracted from. Thus,
Prob(θM(h) = h;h = k; : : : ;m) = Prob(θM(h) = h;h = k+1; : : : ;m)
£Prob(θM(k) = k j θM(h) = h;h = k+1; : : : ;m)
= Πmh=k
wh
∑hh0=1 wh0
:
Therefore, repeating this, we obtain Prob(θM = σ) = Πmh=1
wh
∑hh0=1 wh0
= µw(σ).
Remark 3. ψδ is also considered as a value for C -communication restricted game (N;vC ). However, we
use the weighted Shapley value instead of the usual Shapley value. Given (N;v;C ) 2 Gc, let w = (wi)i2N
be such that wi = 1jCkj for i 2Ck 2 C . Then,
ψg(N;v;C ) = Shw(N;vC ):
See Kamijo (2007).
The communication situation considered in this sub section can be seen as a partition system of Bilbao
(1998). A pair (N;F ), where F µ 2N , is called a partition system if (P1) /0 2 F and for all i 2 N,
fig 2F , and (P2) for all S µ N, the maximal components of S byF , which are defined by fT ½ S : T 2
F and :9T 0 2 F such that T µ T 0 µ Sg, form a partition of S (see definition 1 of his paper). Given a
coalition structure C , defineFC by
FC =
[
Ck2C
2Ck [f
[
k2L
Ck : L µ Mg:
Then, (N;FC ) becomes a partition system.
Given a partition system (N;F ), the restricted game (N;vF ) is defined by
vF (S) = ∑
T2ΠS
v(T );
where ΠS is a partition of S which the maximal feasible subsets of S on F , are called components, form.
By the definition of vC , we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (N;vC ) = (N;vFC ) holds.
Proof. For any S µ N,
C (S)[C 0(S)
is a partition of S and C (S)[C 0(S) = Π(S) holds. By the definitions of vC and vFC , vC = vFC holds.
4.2 An endogenous interpretation of a coalition structure
Aumann and Dreze (1974) consider that one of the transparent explanations for the formation of coalition
structures from games themselves is by the lack of the superadditivity (see the discussion of their paper).
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However, from the viewpoint that players form coalition structures for the bargaining of division of v(N),
we have to introduce another endogenous argument for the formation of coalition structures.
Let (N;v) 2 G. A coalition S is called a partnership in (N;v) if for any T ( S and for any R µ N n S,
v(T [R) = v(R). Further, S is called a quasi-partnership in (N;v) if for any T ( S and for any R µ N n S,
v(T [R) = v(T )+v(R). Thus, players in a quasi-partnership coalition T seem to have some rationale to act
together.
Let (N;v) be a game and C be a coalition structure on N. Then, C is called a quasi-partnership
decomposition with respect to v if every Ck 2C is a quasi-partnership in (N;v). The next theorem indicates
that ψγ is consistent with this endogenous view of the coalition structure and the allocation of the Shapley
value.
Theorem 3. Let (N;v;C )2Gc and w=(wk) such that wk = jCkj. If C is a quasi-partnership decomposition
with respect to v, then
Sh(N;v) = ψγ(N;v;C ):
Proof. If (N;v) = (N;vC ), Theorem 2 implies that Sh(N;v) = Sh(N;vC ) = ψγ(N;v;C ). Thus, it suffices
to show (N;v) = (N;vC ). For any S µ N,
vC (S) = v(
[
Ck2C (S)
Ck)+ ∑
T2C 0(S)
v(T )
= v(S)
where the first equality is by the definition of vC and the second is by the quasi-partnership of Ck 2 C .
5 A potential function for games with coalition structures
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) are the first to introduce a concept of a potential to cooperative game theory and
show that a potential for a game exists (with an additional condition of the normalization, it is unique) and
it derives the Shapley value. After Hart and Mas-Colell, the concept of potential was introduced to a non-
cooperative game by Monderer and Shapley (1996) and has been considered for a cooperative game with
several frameworks such as a game with a coalition structure by Winter (1992), a partition system by Bilbao
(1998), a finite type continuum by Calvo and Santos (1997). Calvo and Santos (1997) also characterized
the family of solutions which admitted a potential function.
Let P denote a real valued function on G which is normalized to P( /0;v) = 0. Given (N;v) 2 G and
i 2 N, define a marginal contribution of player i relative to P by
DiP(N;v) = P(N;v)¡P(N¡ i;v):
Thus, this marginal contribution is the difference of two situations measured by P which player i is there
and he leaves. Function P is called a potential for games if it satisfies
v(N) = ∑
i2N
DiP(N;v)
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for any (N;v)2G. Thus, a potential function is such that the allocation of marginal contributions (according
to the potential function) always adds up exactly to the worth of the grand coalition. Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989) show (in theorem A, p591) that (i) potential function P is uniquely determined, and (ii) the marginal
contribution vector relative to the potential coincides with the Shapley value payoff vector, i.e., DiP(N;v) =
Shi(N;v) for all i 2 N.
They also consider a non-symmetric generalization of a potential approach. Let w=(wi)i be a collection
of the positive weights and Pw denote a real-valued function on G with Pw( /0;v) = 0. Function Pw is called
a w-weighted potential if it satisfies
v(N) = ∑
i2N
wiDiP(N;v)
for any (N;v) 2G. They show (in theorem 5.2, p603) that (i) w-weighted potential function Pw is uniquely
determined, and (ii) the marginal contribution relative to the potential multiplied by the corresponding
weight coincides with the w-weighted Shapley value, i.e., wiDiP(N;v) = Shwi (N;v) for any i 2 N.
According to Calvo and Santos (1997) and Bilbao (1998), a potential function for a game with a re-
stricted communication is Hart and Mas-Colell’s potential function (hereafter, the HM potential function.
Similarly we use the term, the HM w-weighted potential function.) for the corresponding game which is
appropriately defined to reflect the restriction on communication. Thus, the next theorem is an immediate
consequence of Theorem 2.
Theorem 4. Let P : G ! R denote the HM potential function. Then, given any (N;v;C ),
ψγi (N;v;C ) = DiP(N;vC ) = P(N;vC )¡P(N¡ i;vC )
for any i 2 N.
Bilbao (1998) also shows (in theorem 2, p135) that given a partition system (N;F ), for S =2F ,
P(S;vF ) = ∑
T2ΠS
P(T;vF ):
Hence, this result together with (N;vC ) = (N;vFC ) by Proposition 1 implies that for i 2Ck 2 C ,
DiP(N;vC ) = P(N;vC )¡P(N nCk;vC )¡P(Ck¡ i;vC ): (1)
The next proposition gives another formula of P(N;vC ) which seems to describe the restriction of
communication by C well and which is specific expression of the potential for the particular subclass of
games with permission systems, which is different from the class Bilbao (1998) mainly considers.
Proposition 2. Let (N;v;C ) 2 Gc and M = fk : Ck 2 C g. Define a game (M;u) by
u(L) = v(
[
k2L
Ck)¡∑
k2L
v(Ck)+ ∑
k2L
jCkjP(Ck;v)
for each L µ M. Then,
P(N;vC ) = Pw(M;u);
where Pw is the HM w-weighted potential function and w = (wk)k2M is such that wk = jCkj for any k 2 M.
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Proof. Let (N;v;C ) 2Gc be given. Put M = fk : Ck 2 C g. The proof proceeds by the way of mathematical
induction of the number of jMj. For any Ck 2 C ,
P(Ck;vC ) = P(Ck;v) =
1
jCkju(fkg) = P
w(fkg;u);
where the first equality is by (Ck;vC ) = (Ck;v), the second is by the definition of u, and the last is by the
definition of the HM w-weighted potential function and wk = jCkj.
Assume that for any L ( M and N0 =
S
k2L Ck, (N0;vC ) = Pw(L;u) holds. We consider the case for
(N;vC ). By the definition of the potential function,
v(
[
k2M
Ck) = v(N)
= ∑
i2N
DiP(N;vC )
= ∑
k2M
∑
i2Ck
³
P(N;vC )¡P(N nCk;vC )¡P(Ck¡ i;vC )
´
= ∑
k2M
jCkj
³
P(N;vC )¡P(N nCk;vC )
´
¡ ∑
k2M
jCkjP(Ck;vC )+ ∑
k2M
∑
i2Ck
(P(Ck;vC )¡P(Ck¡ i;vC ))
= ∑
k2M
jCkj
³
P(N;vC )¡P(N nCk;vC )
´
¡ ∑
k2M
jCkjP(Ck;vC )+ ∑
k2M
∑
i2Ck
Shi(Ck;vC )
= ∑
k2M
jCkj
³
P(N;vC )¡P(N nCk;vC )
´
¡ ∑
k2M
jCkjP(Ck;v)+ ∑
k2M
v(Ck);
where the third equality is by Equation (1), the second last equality is by the result of the HM potential
function, and the last is by the efficiency of the Shapley value and (Ck;vC ) = (Ck;v). Hence we obtain
∑
k2M
jCkj
³
P(N;vC )¡P(N nCk;vC )
´
= v(
[
k2M
Ck)+ ∑
k2M
jCkjP(Ck;v)¡ ∑
k2M
v(Ck);
By the assumption of the induction and the definition of u, this is equivalent to
∑
k2M
wk
³
P(N;vC )¡Pw(M nfkg;u)
´
= u(M);
where wk = jCkj for any k 2 M. Therefore the uniqueness of the weighted potential implies P(N;vC ) must
be Pw(M;u).
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6 Axiomatic characterizations
6.1 Collective balanced contributions
The balanced contributions property for the Shapley value was first considered by Myerson (1980). It
means that any two players’ marginal contributions to the other measured by the Shapley value balance.
In other words, the Shapley value satisfies, given two players i 2 N and j 2 N, Shi(N;v)¡Shi(N¡ j;v) =
Sh j(N;v)¡ Sh j(N ¡ i;v). Myerson (1980) showed that the efficiency and this property characterize the
Shapley value.
Extensions of the balanced contributions to a game with a coalition structure is considered by Calvo,
Lasaga, and Winter (1996). They introduce two counterparts of the balanced contributions to that case and
show that a unique efficient solution on Gc satisfying these two properties is the Owen’s coalitional value.
These two are:
Individual Balanced Contributions: For i 2Ck and j 2Ck, Ck 2 C ,
ψi(N;v;C )¡ψi(N¡ j;v;C ¡ j) = ψ j(N;v)¡ψ j(N¡ i;v;C ¡ i)
where C ¡ i = C nfCkg[fCk¡ ig.
Coalitional Balanced Contributions: For Ck 2 C and for Ch 2 C ,
∑
i2Ck
(ψi(N;v;C )¡ψi(N nCh;v;C nfChg)) = ∑
i2Ch
(ψi(N;v;C )¡ψi(N nCk;v;C nfCkg)) :
However, we introduce different extensions of the balanced contributions for games with coalition
structures. One is just the same requirement as the condition for the Shapley value, and the other is easily
interpreted.
Balanced Contributions: For i 2 N and j 2 N,
ψi(N;v;fNg)¡ψi(N¡ j;v;fN¡ jg) = ψ j(N;v;fNg)¡ψ j(N¡ i;v;fN¡ ig):
Collective Balanced Contributions: If jC j= 2, for every i 2Ck 2 C and for every j 2Ch 2 C , Ck 6=Ch,
ψi(N;v;C )¡ψi(N nCh;v;C nfChg) = ψ j(N;v;C )¡ψ j(N nCk;v;C nfCkg):
Since (N;v;fNg) is looked as the same situation as (N;v),7 Balanced Contributions is the same con-
dition as the one which the Shapley value satisfies, and thus we use the same name. Collective Balanced
Contributions requires that ‘my group’s contribution for your payoff measured by the solution balances
with your group’s contribution for my payoff measured by the solution.’
On the relationship between our axioms and ones of Calvo, Lasaga, and Winter (1996), Individual
Balanced Contributions implies Balanced Contributions. Collective Balanced Contributions induces Coali-
tional Balanced Contributions only if jCkj = jChj. However, in general, there is no general relationship
7In fact, all the values for games with coalition structures considered in this paper, AD, CV, ψδ , and ψγ , for (N;v;fNg)
coincide with the Shapley value for (N;v).
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between Collective Balanced Contributions and Coalitional Balanced Contributions. The next proposition
shows that ψγ satisfies Balanced Contributions and Collective Balanced Contributions instead of Individual
Balanced Contributions and Coalitional Balanced Contributions.
Proposition 3. ψγ satisfies Balanced Contributions and Collective Balanced Contributions.
Proof. First consider the case of jC j= 1. By definition of ψγ , ψγ(N;v;fNg) = Sh(N;v) holds. We obtain
the desired result because of the result of Myerson (1980).
Next we consider the case of jC j= 2. Note that by the definition of C -communication restricted game,
(N nCk;vC ) which is a subgame of (N;vC ) on N nCk, coincides with (N nCk;vC nfCkg) which is C n fCkg-
restricted game for game (N nfCkg;v;C nfCkg). By Theorem 2, the property of the HM potential function
and Equation (1)
ψγi (N;v;C )¡ψγi (N nCh;v;C nfChg)
= Shi(N;vC )¡Shi(N nCh;vC )
= P(N;C )¡P(N nCk;vC )¡P(Ck¡ i;vC )
¡
³
P(N nCh;vC )¡P(N n (Ck[Ch);vC )¡P(Ck¡ i;vC )
´
= P(N;vC )¡P(N nCk;vC )¡
³
P(N nCh;vC )¡P(N n (Ck[Ch);vC )
´
= P(N;vC )¡P(N nCh;vC )¡
³
P(N nCk;vC )¡P(N n (Ck[Ch);vC )
´
= P(N;vC )¡P(N nCh;vC )¡P(Ch¡ j;vC )
¡
³
P(N nCk;vC )¡P(N n (Ck[Ch);vC )¡P(Ch¡ j;vC )
´
= Sh j(N;vC )¡Sh j(N nCk;vC )
= ψγj (N;v;C )¡ψγj (N nCk;v;C nfCkg):
This proposition means that, by the definition of ψγ , for every Ck 2 C and for every Ch 2 C ,
Shwk (M;vC )¡Shwk (M nfhg;vC )
jCkj =
Shwh (M;vC )¡Shwh (M nfkg;vC )
jChj :
This is the special case of the properties of the w-weighted Shapley value: For (N;v) 2 G, its weight
(wi)i2N , and for every i; j 2 N,8
Shwi (N;v)¡Shwi (N nf jg;v)
wi
=
Shwj (N;v)¡Shwj (N nfig;v)
w j
:
Next theorem shows that Balanced Contributions and Collective Balanced Contributions are almost
sufficient to characterize ψγ .
8This property is pointed out in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Amer and Carreras (1997).
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Theorem 5. ψγ is a unique efficient solution satisfying the following two properties:
(i) Balanced Contributions.
(ii) Collective Balanced Contributions.
Proof. We have known that ψγ satisfies the efficiency, Balanced Contributions and Collective Balanced
Contributions. Hence we will show the converse.
Let ψ be an efficient solution satisfying these two axioms. Fix (N;v;C )2Gc. We first show that ψ coin-
cides with the Shapley value when jC j= 1 or n. When jC j= n, Collective Balanced Contributions coincides
with the balanced contributions. Because of the result of Myerson (1980), ψ(N;v; [N]) = Sh(N;v). More-
over, by Balanced Contributions, the same argument means that ψ(N;v;fNg) = ψ(N;v; [N]) = Sh(N;v).
Next we show the following claims.
Claim 1: For all Ck 2 C ,
∑
i2Ck
ψi(N;v;C ) = jCkjDkPw(M;vC ) (2)
where Pw is the HM w-weighted potential function with weight vector w = (wk)k2M such that wk = jCkj for
each k 2 M.
Let (Ck;v;fCkg) be a subgame of (N;v;C ) to coalition Ck. Then the left hand side of (2) is
∑
i2Ck
ψi(Ck;v;fCkg) = v(Ck)
by the efficiency of ψ . The right hand side of (2) is
jCkjDkPw(fkg;vC ) = jCkjv(Ck)jCkj = v(Ck):
Thus, condition (2) holds true for any subgame (Ck;v;fCkg) of (N;v;C ).
We assume that (2) is satisfied for any (N0;v;C 0) such that L(M, N0 = [k2LCk and C 0 = fCk : k 2 Lg.
We now show that it holds true for (N;v;C ).
Condition (2) is equivalent to
∑
i2Ck
ψi(N;v;C ) = jCkj(Pw(M;vC )¡Pw(M nfkg;vC )):
Then we obtain
Pw(M;vC ) =
∑i2Ck ψi(N;v;C )
jCkj +P
w(M nfkg;vC ):
We show that ∑i2Ck ψi(N;v;C )jCkj +P
w(M nfkg;vC ) is constant for every k 2 M. Take any Ck 2 C and Ch 2
C ;Ck 6=Ch. Then,
∑i2Ck ψi(N;v;C )
jCkj +P
w(M nfkg;vC )¡
µ∑ j2Ch ψ j(N;v;C )
jChj +P
w(M nfhg;vC )
¶
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equals
∑i2Ck ψi(N;v;C )
jCkj ¡
∑ j2Ch ψ j(N;v;C )
jChj +
³
Pw(M nfkg;vC )¡Pw(M nfhg;vC )
´
: (3)
The bracketed terms in (3) equals
Pw(M nfkg;vC )¡Pw(M nfk;hg;vC )¡
¡
Pw(M nfhg;vC )¡Pw(M nfk;hg;vC )
¢
:
By the definition of operator D and the assumption,
=DhPw(M nfkg;vC )¡DkPw(M nfhg;vC )
=
∑ j2Ch ψ j(N nCk;v;C nfCkg)
jChj ¡
∑i2Ck ψi(N nfChg;v;C nfChg)
jCkj :
Substitute the above for the bracketed terms in (3), and we obtain
∑i2Ck ψi(N;v;C )
jCkj ¡
∑ j2Ch ψ j(N;v;C )
jChj
+
∑ j2Ch ψ j(N nCk;v;C nfCkg)
jChj ¡
∑i2Ck ψi(N nfChg;v;C nfChg)
jCkj :
Note that by Collective Balanced Contributions, ψi(N;v;C )¡ψi(N n fChg;v;C n fChg) = ψ j(N;v;C )¡
ψ j(N nfCkg;v;C nfCkg) is constant for every i 2Ck and for every j 2Ch. Hence the above expression is
zero and thus, (3) equals zero.
Therefore for some real number K,
∑i2Ck ψi(N;v;C )
jCkj +P
w(M nfkg;vC ) = K
holds true for any k 2 M.
Then by efficiency of ψ , we obtain that
vC (M) = v(N) = ∑
k2M
∑
i2Ck
ψi(N;v;C ) = ∑
k2M
jCkj(K¡Pw(M nfkg;vC ))
Therefore K is exactly the HM weighted potential function Pw(M;vC ) because of its uniqueness.
Next we show the following claim.
Claim 2: ψi(N;v;C ) = ¯C+ψi(Ck;v;fCkg) for every i 2Ck where ¯C is a constant real number.
We prove Claim 2 by the induction on the cardinality of C . When jC j= 1, this is obvious because we
simply put ¯C = 0.
Assume that the claim holds true when the number of elements in C is less than m(m= 2). For (N;v;C )
such that jC j= m, by Collective Balanced Contributions, given Ch 2 C , we have
ψi(N;v;C )¡ψi(N nCh;v;C nfChg) = ¯C1 for every i 2Ck;Ck 6=Ch
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By the assumption of the induction, the left hand side of the above equation is
ψi(N;v;C )¡ ( ¯C2 +ψi(Ck;v;fCkg));
where ¯C2 is constant for all i 2Ck. Therefore we obtain
ψi(N;v;C ) = ¯C1 + ¯C2 +ψi(Ck;vfCkg) = ¯C+ψi(Ck;v;fCkg):
This is the desired result.
By Claim 1, we know that the summation of ψi(N;v;C ) over i 2 Ck is exactly jCkjDkPw(M;vC ) =
Shwk (M;vC ). Then we conclude that
¯C =
Shwk (M;vC )¡∑i2Ck ψi(Ck;v;fCkg)
jCkj =
Shwk (M;vC )¡ v(Ck)
jCkj
by efficiency of ψ . Therefore if ψi(Ck;v;fCkg) is uniquely determined, ψ(N;v;C ) is also determined.
However when jC j= 1, we have shown that ψ equals the Shapley value Sh. Hence we obtain
ψi(N;v;C ) =
Shwk (M;vC )¡ v(Ck)
jCkj +Shi(Ck;v):
As in the proof of Theorem 5, Balanced Contributions is necessary only to prove that if C = fNg, the
solution coincides with the Shapley value for (N;v). Thus the following corollaries also hold.
Corollary 1. ψγ is a unique efficient solution satisfying the following two properties:
(i) ψ(N;v;fNg) = Sh(N;v) for all (N;v) 2 Γ.
(ii) Collective Balanced Contributions.
Corollary 2. ψγ is a unique efficient solution satisfying the following two properties:
(i) Coincidence between the Grand and the Singleton Coalition Structure: For all (N;v)2Γ, ψ(N;v;fNg)=
ψ(N;v; [N]),
(ii) Collective Balanced Contributions.
6.2 Additivity
In this subsection, we provide an axiomatization of ψγ through the additivity axiom. Let ψ be a solution
on Gc. Let (N;v;C );(N;v0;C ) 2 Gc.
Theorem 6. ψγ is a unique efficient solution on Gc satisfying the following four axioms.
(i) Additivity: ψ(N;v;C )+ψ(N;v0;C ) = ψ(N;v+ v0;C ), where (v+ v0)(S) = v(S)+ v0(S) for all S µ N.
(ii) Equal Power of Partnership Members: If T µN is a partnership in (N;v) and M0= fk2M : Ck\T 6= /0g
is also a partnership in (M;vC ), then ψi(N;v;C ) = ψ j(N;v;C ) for any i; j 2 T .
17
(iii) Strong Restricted Equal Treatment Property: If i 2 Ck and j 2 Ck are symmetric in (Ck;v), then
ψi(N;v;C ) = ψ j(N;v;C ).
(iv) Coalition Structure-Null Player: If Ck is a dummy coalition (i.e., k is a dummy player in (M;vC )) and
i 2Ck is a null player in (N;v), then ψi(N;v;C ) = 0. .
Equal Power of Partnership Members says that all the members of partnership T obtain the equal payoff
if its projection on M is also a partnership in (M;vC ). The extended Shapley value defined by Sh(N;v;C ) =
Sh(N;v) satisfies Equal Power of Partnership Members because all the players in T are symmetric in (N;v)
and the Shapley value assigns equal payoff to symmetric players.
Strong Restricted Equal Treatment and Coalition Structure-Null Player are the axioms introduced in
Kamijo (2007) to characterize ψδ (see Remark 2 of this paper). Strong Restricted Equal Treatment is
stronger than the restricted equal treatment property which both the extended Shapley value and the Owen’s
coalitional value satisfy. Coalition Structure-Null Player is weaker than the usual null player axiom. Thus
the extended Shapley value satisfies the all the properties except for Strong Restricted Equal Treatment and
the Owen’s coalitional value does not satisfies Equal Power of Partnership Members and Strong Restricted
Equal Treatment.
The next lemma is from Kalai and Samet (1987).
Lemma 1. Let w 2 RN++ be a weight vector of N. If T is a partnership in (N;v), then Shwi (N;v)=wi =
Shwj (N;v)=w j for all i; j 2 T .
Proof. See the proof of Theorem 2 of Kalai and Samet (1987).
Lemma 2. Let φ be a solution on G such that it satisfies the symmetry and the null player axioms. Let ψ
be a two step solution on Gc defined by
ψi(N;v;C ) =
Shwk (M;vC )¡ v(Ck)
jCkj +φi(Ck;v):
for all (N;v;C ) 2Gc and for all i 2Ck 2 C , where w = (wk)k2M is such that wk = jCkj for all k 2M. Then,
ψ satisfies Equal Power of Partnership Members.
Proof. Let T µN be a partnership in (N;v) and M0 = fk 2M : Ck\T 6= /0g be also a partnership in (M;vC ).
Suppose jM0j = 2. Let k 2 M0. Since T is a partnership in (N;v), v(S[C) = v(S) for any S µCk nT and
C µ T \Ck ( T . Thus, for any S µ Ck, v(S) = v(S\ (Ck n T )) and thus, any i 2 T \Ck is a null player
in subgame (Ck;v). So ϕi(Ck;v) = 0 for any i 2 T \Ck since ϕ satisfies the null player axiom. Because
wk = jCkj for any k 2 M, Sh
w
k (M;vC )
jCkj =
Shwh (M;vC )
jChj for any k;h 2 M0 by Lemma 1. By the partnership of M0 in
(M;vC ), vC (fkg) = v(Ck) = 0 for each k 2 M0. Thus ψi(N;v;C ) = ψ j(N;v;C ) holds for any i; j 2 T .
Suppose jM0j = 1 and let k 2 M0. Since T µ Ck is a partnership in (N;v), all the players in T are
symmetric in (N;v) and, of course, they are symmetric in (Ck;v). Thus Shi(Ck;v) is constant over i 2 T .
Hence ψ satisfies Equal Power of Partnership Members.
Proof of Theorem 6. From Lemma 2, we have known that ψγ satisfies Equal Power of Partnership Member
since the Shapley value satisfies the symmetry and the null player axioms. Furthermore, it is obvious that
it satisfies axioms (i) to (iii) by its definition.
18
Next we show the converse part. Let ψ be an efficient solution on Gc which satisfies axioms (i) to
(iv). Let (N;v;C ) 2 Gc. Since ψ satisfies Additivity, it is sufficient to show that ψ(N;cuT ;C ) is uniquely
determined for any T µ N, where c 2R and cuT is a scalar multiple of uT by c. Let D = fk 2M : Ck\T 6=
/0g. Since Ck 2 C , k =2 D, is a dummy coalition and i 2Ck is a null player, ψi(N;cuT ;C ) = 0 by Coalition
Structure-Null Player. Thus, efficiency means that ∑k2D ∑i2Ck ψi(N;cuT ;C ) = c.
Clearly T is a partnership in (N;cuT ) and D is also a partnership in (M;(uT )C ). Therefore ψi(N;cuT ;C )=
ψ j(N;cuT ;C ) for all i; j 2 T by Equal Power of Partnership Members.
Case a: jDj= 1. Let k2D. Since Ck is a dummy coalition and i2CknT is a null player, ψi(N;cuT ;C )=
0 by Coalition Structure-Null Player. Thus, ψi(N;cuT ;C ) = cjT j .
Case b: jDj = 2. For each Ck 2 C , k 2 D, i 2 Ck and j 2 Ck are symmetric in (Ck;v). Therefore
ψi(N;cuT ;C ) = ψ j(N;cuT ;C ) by Strong Restricted Equal Treatment Property. Moreover ψi(NcuT ;C ) =
ψ j(N;cuT ;C ) for i 2 T \Ck and for j 2 T \Ch. As a result, for any i 2 [k2DCk, ψi(N;cuT ;C ) = c∑h2D jChj .
Remark 4. The efficiency of a solution is derived from the four axioms in Theorem 6. In fact, consider
a solution ψ satisfying these four. The main logic is similar to Theorem 8.1.3 of Peleg and Sudho¨lter
(2003). Let (N;v0) be zero-game such that v0(S) = 0 for any S µ N and C be a coalition structure on
N. Then, ψ(N;v0;C ) must be 0N 2 RN by Coalition Structure-Null Player. Let (N;v;C ) 2 Gc. By Addi-
tivity, ψ(N;v;C )+ψ(N;¡v;C )=ψ(N;v¡v;C )=ψ(N;v0;C )= 0N and thus, ψ(N;v;C )=¡ψ(N;¡v;C )
holds. Since the payoff proposed by a solution must be feasible, ∑i2N ψi(N;v;C )5 v(N) and ∑i2N ψi(N;v;C )=
¡∑i2N ψi(N;¡v;C )=¡(¡v(N)). Thus, ∑i2N ψi(N;v;C ) = v(N) holds.
Example 1. The following solutions show the independence of each axiom from the others (except the
efficiency) in Theorem 6. Let (N;v;C ) 2 Gc.
(i) Consider a solution ψn defined by
Shwk (M;vC )¡ v(Ck)
jCkj +Nu
n
i (Ck;v)
where w2RM++ is such that wk = jCkj and Nun is the nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969). Since
ϕn satisfies the symmetry and the null player axioms, ψn satisfies Equal Power of Partnership Member
by Lemma 2. Thus, ψn satisfies Strong Restricted Equal Treatment, Equal Power of Partnership
Members and Coalition Structure-Null Player since Nu satisfies the symmetry and the null player
axioms, but the additivity since ϕn does not satisfy the additivity.
(ii) The extended Shapley value satisfies all the axioms except for Strong Restricted Equal Treatment.
(iii) ψδ is characterized by Additivity, Strong Restricted Equal Treatment, Coalition Structure-Null Player
and Coalitional Symmetry which is defined by, if k 2 M and h 2 M are symmetric in (M;vC ), then
∑i2Ck ψi(N;v;C ) = ∑i2Ch ψi(N;v;C ). Since ψδ and ψγ are the different solutions, Equal Power of
Partnership Members is independent of the other axioms.
(iv) The egalitarian solution defined by ψei (N;v;C ) = v(N)jNj for all i 2 N satisfies all the axioms except for
Coalition Structure-Null Player.
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7 Concluding remarks
Recently, Vidal-Puga (2005) considered another value on games with coalition structures from a viewpoint
of non-cooperative bargaining among the players. This solution also satisfies the condition that the sum of
the payoffs of the players in Ck coincides with the weighted Shapley value of player k for the external game
with coalition-size weights. Vidal-Puga (2005) states that a generation of coalition size weights is due to
“right to talk” of players. In contrast, in this paper, we show that the generation of coalition size weights is
due to communication restriction by coalitions.
Finally, our solution can be extended to games with levels structures introduced by Winter (1989).
Levels structure on N is a finite sequence of coalition structures, C 0; : : : ;C l with C 0 = [N] and C l = fNg
such that if k < h, C k is a finer coalition structure than C h. Consider the levels structure for six person
game described by Table 1. Then, the payoff for player 1 is calculated as the following way.
level coalition structure
3 C 3 ff1;2;3;4;5;6gg
2 C 2 ff1;2;3g;f4;5g;f6gg
1 C 1 ff1;2g;f3g;f4g;f5g;f6gg
0 C 0 ff1g;f2g;f3g;f4g;f5g;f6gg
Table 1: Levels structure on N = f1;2;3;4;5;6g
First, in level C 2, coalitions f1;2;3g, f4;5g and f6g bargain for the division of v(N). As a result,
coalition f1;2;3g obtains Shw1 (M21 ;vC 2) where M21 = f1;2;3g and w1 = 3, w2 = 2 and w3 = 1. Then, player
1 receives his dividend for this bargaining surplus, that is, Sh
w
1 (M21 ;vC 2 )¡v(f1;2;3g)
jf1;2;3gj . Next, in level C
1
, coalitions
f1;2g and f3g bargain for the division of v(f1;2;3g) and f1;2g obtains Shw1 (M11 ;vC 1) where M11 = f1;2g
and w1 = 2 and w2 = 1. Player 1 receives
Shw1 (M11 ;vC 1 )¡v(f1;2g)
jf1;2gj . Finally, in level C
0
, players 1 and 2 bargain
for the division of v(f1;2g) and player 1 obtains Sh1(f1;2g;v). Therefore, the payoff for player 1 is
Shw1 (M21 ;vC 2)¡ v(f1;2;3g)
jf1;2;3gj +
Shw1 (M11 ;vC 1)¡ v(f1;2g)
jf1;2gj +Sh1(f1;2g;v):
Generally, let (N;v;L ) be a game with levels structure where (N;v) 2 G and L = fC 0; : : : ;C lg is
a levels structure on N. For each k = 0; : : : ; l, let C k = fCk1; : : : ;Ckmkg and Mk = f1; : : : ;mkg. For given
i 2 N, let i(k) denote a coalitional index of coalition of level k which player i belongs to, i.e., Cki(k) 2 C k and
i 2Cki(k). Further, put Mki = fh 2 Mk : Ckh µCk+1i(k+1)g and wkh = jCkhj for all h 2 Mki . Of course, i(k) 2 Mki .
Let (Mki ;vC k) be a subgame of (Mk;vC k) on Mki .
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Definition 3. A value ψγ for (N;v;L ) is defined by
ψγi (N;v;L ) =
l¡1
∑
k=0
Shwki(k)(Mki ;vC k)¡ v(Cki(k))
jCki(k)j
+ v(fig)
=
l¡1
∑
k=1
Shwki(k)(Mki ;vC k)¡ v(Cki(k))
jCki(k)j
+Shi(C1i(1);v)
for all i 2 N.
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